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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## NEW BALANCE OF POWER UNDERLIES BIG-THREE DISPUTES AT PARIS

ONE of the most dangerous crises in the long and difficult process of peacemaking came to a climax on August 9, when 15 of the 21 nations represented at Paris agreed that the conference should make recommendations to the Council of Foreign Ministers concerning the peace settlements with the Axis satellites by a majority as well as by a two-thirds vote. As a result of this decision, the conferees at the Luxembourg Palace are finally able to move on from procedural matters to a consideration of the draft treaties themselves. Since, however, the conference finds itself in the anomalous position of operating under rules which do not meet with the approval of Russia and the five pro-Soviet delegations, it is by no means certain that the bitter debate over procedure will not arise in some new and equally serious form at a later date.

**TECHNICALITIES OBSCURE ISSUES.** Perhaps one of the most unfortunate aspects of the debate at Paris concerning the majority versus the two-thirds rule is that it involved procedural points which were so fine-spun that even the delegates themselves frequently appeared to have considerable difficulty in deciding just what the issues were. Under these conditions it is hardly surprising that public interest in the conference has dwindled in this country and been replaced by a widespread feeling of confusion and frustration. This sense of disillusionment is all the greater because the disagreements over procedure at Paris have followed a pattern which is by now all too familiar. Again and again in the course of the meetings held during the past year to prepare the draft treaties, the major diplomatic battles between Russia and the Western powers have been fought over procedural points which were calculated to determine how substantive issues would be handled later.

What are the issues that are actually at stake in all the tactical maneuvering that has thus far accompanied the peacemaking process? Why has the formula for peacemaking that the Big Three evolved at the Potsdam conference just a year ago this month been the subject of such diverse interpretations on the part of Moscow, Washington and London? This formula, it will be recalled, provided that the peace treaties should be drafted by the Foreign Ministers of the great powers, preparatory to their "submission to the United Nations." How many other Allied nations should be included in their deliberations, however, and—above all—how much weight should be given to the recommendations of these smaller powers were left open to subsequent negotiations, most of which have created considerable confusion because both Russia and the Western powers have had plausible arguments.

The Soviet contention that the participation of the smaller Allied nations should be kept to a minimum rests upon the realistic assumption that no peace treaties can be concluded unless unanimity exists among the Big Three. On the other hand, it is equally true, as Britain and the United States insist, that there is no satisfactory reason for holding a general peace conference if this body is so hedged about by restrictions that it cannot function even in its limited capacity as a sounding board for those nations whose proportionately large sacrifices in behalf of victory give them a right to be heard.

**WHY RUSSIA GUARDS PREROGATIVES.** But the mere fact that both Russia and the Western powers have logical arguments on their sides does little to explain their respective attitudes on the question of how the peace settlement should be made. Whether logical or not, the theory of great power unanimity as the basis for peace would se-

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cure Russia's support at the Paris conference for two reasons. In the first place, Russia wishes to prevent the conference from upsetting the draft treaties for Eastern Europe. A survey of the membership of the committees which will consider the proposed treaties with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary reveals that Russia will be able to block any suggestion by these groups provided a two-thirds vote is required for recommendations. It appears, therefore, that Soviet leaders are willing to modify the draft treaties with the former Axis satellites, if at all, only in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The second and more important reason for Russia's essentially negative attitude toward the Paris conference is to be found in the Soviet conviction that its present position in world affairs would be seriously weakened if any inroads were made in the theory of great power unanimity as the basis for peacemaking. To some extent this belief is undoubtedly a reflection of Russia's own dictatorial form of government and resulting sense of insecurity both at home and abroad. But it should also be frankly admitted by the United States and Britain that any reduction in the peacemaking prerogatives of the great powers would almost certainly have different results for Russia than it would for

them. Since the U.S.S.R. is a newcomer on the international stage and has not developed strong ties with the governments of numerous small powers, and since the Soviet type of régime is actively feared in many quarters, it should be recognized that Russia would find itself repeatedly outvoted in any inter-allied meeting. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Russia views any proposal to experiment with voting by an arithmetical majority as a genuine threat and looks to its own diplomacy to safeguard what Moscow considers its basic interests. All this does not mean that the Western powers support the rights of small nations because of Machiavellian rather than idealistic reasons. Nevertheless, the championship by Washington and London of "democracy" versus "great power dictatorship" at Paris should not obscure the fundamental fact which has affected all the debates concerning peacemaking procedure during the past year. This fact is that Russia has emerged from World War II as a strong and expanding state, and that Britain and the United States are, therefore, eager to secure the support of the smaller Allied nations in establishing a new international balance of power.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

### BRITAIN PRESSES U.S. FOR CLEARER POLICY ON PALESTINE

Taking forcible measures to prevent further Jewish immigration into Palestine, Britain sealed off the port of Haifa on August 11 and prepared to deport the Jewish refugees crowded on boats in the harbor. The government in Whitehall issued notice on August 12 that it intends to maintain the status quo in Palestine until word is received from Washington, members of the Jewish Agency, and Arab leaders about the proposal to partition the mandate.

As yet the President and State Department have not announced any policy toward Palestine. But reports on August 9 indicated that Mr. Truman might be prepared to accept a divided Palestine if it were opened immediately to the 100,000 Jews, as he had originally requested. Later bulletins from Washington forecast that America would favor a partition of the mandate if the Jewish sector were enlarged. It was suggested also that the United States might contribute as much as \$300,000,000 to raise the economic and social standards of the Arab states, \$50,000,000 being earmarked for the Arabs in Palestine. In addition, wide latitude for Jews to control their own immigration would be requested under this plan.

**WIDER ISSUES AT STAKE.** Whatever final decision the President makes about Palestine, he must bear in mind the broad scope of America's policy in the Middle East. Britain is now readjusting its relations with the Arab states and is withdrawing its military forces from Egypt. By partitioning the mandate London hopes to reduce Arab-Jewish tension

there and provide areas where military installations may be placed within easy reach of the vital Suez Canal. It is very doubtful, however, whether Britain can succeed in quieting Arab-Jewish rivalries by this means. Nor is it likely that Britain can thus secure its wider strategic aims in the Middle East.

The recent labor troubles in the rich oil lands of lower Iran have demonstrated anew that Britain's hold over the Arab world is under attack. Disputes between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its workers, provoked by the Communist-dominated Tudeh party, have caused London to send additional military forces to the Persian Gulf within the range of Iran, and roused Teheran to sharp protest. The Tudeh party has followed closely the tack which Russia takes toward Britain's policy in the Arab states.

The Anglo-Soviet struggle for influence in this region has become clearer with every passing month since the Azerbaijan revolt in northern Iran last fall. Turkey revealed on August 12 that Russia had outlined its stand on the future control of the Dardanelles. The USSR demands that the Straits be regulated only by the states bordering on the Black Sea. Such a régime would give Russia a dominant status there, excluding both Britain and the United States. America is not now a signatory to the Montreux Convention governing the Dardanelles, but Turkey hopes that this country will take part in the future administration. Moscow has also taken a

more direct interest in the Palestine issue, and on August 10 *Izvestia* charged that the British partition plan had but one aim, the strengthening of British domination in the countries of the Middle East.

**WHAT CAN THE U.S. DO?** A showdown on Palestine appears imminent, whether or not it permanently settles the controversy. London offered at one time to turn the mandate over to the United Nations. Foreign Office spokesmen have since said that Britain will go ahead with its own plans for Palestine regardless of America's answer to the partition scheme. British officials have repeatedly asked America for financial and military aid in adopting any new approach to Palestine. Under these circumstances, what course should the United States take?

President Truman has wisely attempted to rescue 100,000 Jews in Europe. But while insisting on swift action to care for these displaced persons, America also should fully support UNRRA, or its successor, in making adequate arrangements for the other million or more stranded refugees in Europe. Both measures will involve considerable financial outlays. And if the President wishes to cut through the vagueness now surrounding our policy, he will notify Congress forthwith that it will be asked to make such appropriations. In addition, the President should ask Congress to liberalize our immigration rules in order to relieve the larger refugee problem.

As for Palestine's status, the United States should firmly state that it is in favor of transferring the mandate to the UN Trusteeship Council, soon to be organized. This move, once it is taken, will precipitate an involved struggle about the future trustee or trustees to be appointed. But by taking joint action about Palestine, the Big Three, and the Arab states as well, can prevent Palestine from becoming the source of further bitterness among them all.

## END OF UNRRA POSES PROBLEM OF WORLD FOOD DISTRIBUTION

On the world food front, the United States has recently made two important decisions, both of which reflect a desire that in the future food distribution be handled on an individual country basis. Shortly before the fifth council session of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration met in Geneva on August 5, the State Department held a series of talks with British and Canadian officials on the continuance of UNRRA. It was decided that the agency should be disbanded in Europe beginning October 1, and in the Far East by April 1. Those countries which have been the recipients of relief—Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece have received by far the largest share of the 13,000,000 tons of food, medicines and supplies so far distributed—were informed at that time by Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton that the demise

Since it is probable that joint economic undertakings are necessary to stabilize the Arab lands, the United Nations should propose that funds be made available to improve health facilities, increase industry and begin agricultural reforms. The strike against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company shows clearly that unless fundamental changes are inaugurated in economically backward countries like Iran, Russia will continue to exploit local grievances against the Western powers.

The United States and Britain must be largely responsible for such economic aid, and the recent indication that America is seriously considering a grant of \$300,000,000 for rehabilitation work in the Middle East is one of the first signs that this country is facing squarely the issues involved in the Palestine problem. The reduction of political tensions in this area and the establishment of higher living standards will ultimately mean greater trading opportunities and less likelihood that America will be involved in war at some future date in the Middle East.

Oil resources and strategic outposts of the region are important to the United States as well as Britain or Russia. But if unilateral decisions are taken by each of the great powers about oil and bases in the Arab states, war can be the only result. If this country wishes to lift the problem out of its present morass it will announce what security proposals it wishes to make for this area. Part of any broadly conceived solution for Palestine's problem and the security of the Middle East must include United Nations military arrangements. But the United States has yet to urge the Security Council to outline any such plans. Washington must still do so if this country's policy toward the Middle East is to consist of more than good intentions.

GRANT S. MCCLELLAN

of UNRRA was impending. As further evidence of the new policy to move food through normal channels, it was announced in Washington on August 8 that the Cabinet had declined to endorse the plan of Sir John Orr, Director General of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, whereby an international agency would be established to control food prices and distribute surpluses to needy nations.

**RELIEF ON A NATIONAL BASIS.** The new United States policy was explained to the UNRRA Council on August 7 by Mr. Clayton, who had come to Geneva via Paris where he is reported to have discussed the political implications of the end of UNRRA with Secretary of State Byrnes. Mr. Clayton informed the Council that the immediate post-war emergency was nearly at an end, and that the "proper solution for any country that may require



assistance is to apply on an individual basis to another country which in its opinion is able and prepared to furnish this assistance." He recommended further that a new international agency be created to provide for refugees and displaced persons; that the health work be taken over by the new World Health Organization; and that the World Bank be employed to finance some of the rehabilitation requirements.

The decision of the United States to end its contributions to UNRRA was based in part upon the opinion of food experts that the current crop outlook in Europe is much improved. In a report issued on July 28, the Department of Agriculture stated that European crops will reach almost 90 per cent of their prewar average, compared to 80 per cent in the 1945-46 crop year. For the Far East, however, it was predicted that many would die of starvation before this fall's rice harvest; even after the harvest, the rice supply would still be 10 per cent short. But, until April 1, 1947 at least, the Chinese will continue to receive UNRRA aid, although well-founded charges of inefficiency and use of supplies for political purposes prompted LaGuardia on July 9 to limit shipments to vital foodstuffs. Famine is no recent phenomenon in China; the current crisis, however, has certainly been aggravated by the failure of rival factions to achieve unity and reduce their armed forces. Whether the new United States policy will induce China to return its peasant soldiers to farms remains to be seen; the outlook is not very encouraging.

In Europe, political considerations are also a factor prompting the decision to put relief on a national basis. Mr. Byrnes, in speeches before the Council of Foreign Ministers and more recently at the Paris Peace Conference, has made it clear that the United States is convinced that the delay in working out treaties for the Axis satellites, and the resulting failure to withdraw occupation forces, have retarded European economic recovery. Russian forces in Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria have been charged with removing food supplies of those countries to the extent that, in the case of Austria, UNRRA was called upon to give assistance. Before the war the Danubian states produced food surpluses, supplying other deficit countries in Europe; these trade relationships, it is argued, should be restored forthwith. Under the Yalta declaration, Britain, Russia and the United States agreed to take joint action in that direction; but to date the agreement has not been implemented. In the case of Hungary, the Russian thesis has been that economic re-

covery should be worked out by the Hungarian government alone, otherwise the sovereignty of that country is undermined.

**U.S. COOL TO WORLD FOOD PLAN.** With the end of UNRRA in sight, countries needing food and lacking foreign exchange to pay for it have shown a renewed interest in the FAO, which is scheduled to meet in Copenhagen on September 2, at which time it will consider the proposal of Director General Sir John Orr to establish world control over food prices by "buffer stock operations," with surpluses distributed on a relief basis. The United States last week, however, indicated its disapproval of this plan. Washington experts fear that the cost of the program will be prohibitive for this country. But although the plan is defective for economic reasons, its objective is commendable—it seeks to avoid the errors of the interwar period when some areas suffered from food gluts and low prices, while elsewhere many people went hungry for want of adequate purchasing power.

HAROLD H. HUTCHESON

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